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The study’s main thesis is that respect for some moral values is a condition for 
methodologically rational decisions, namely, decisions which do not satisfy the condition are 
either not methodologically rational at all, or not fully rational. The paper shows supporting 
arguments for the thesis in terms of the philosophical theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, 
Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and some other thinkers. Their 




The objectives of a decision are of an instrumental value (instrumental values) for the agent, 
when (in his/her opinion) they are conditions for, or conductive to some other objectives 
he/she aims to achieve. The objectives of a decision are of an autotelic value (autotelic values) 
for the agent, when he/she appreciates them regardless of their instrumental value (they are 
valuable for him/her regardless of whether he/she thinks that their implementation would 
bring some benefit other than their achievement). As noted by among others, Max Weber, the 
agent perceives them as “values in themselves” or “intrinsic values” (Ger. Eigenwert). 
(Weber, 1985, p. 565).Such objectives are called “moral values” in this study.  
The main thesis of the study is that respect for some moral (autotelic) values is a 
condition for methodologically rational decisions, namely, the decisions which do not 
satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all or not fully rational. 
It is a moral condition for methodologically rational decision making. The paper shows 
arguments supporting the thesis in theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Tadeusz 
Kotarbiński, Jean Paul Sartre, Max Weber and some other thinkers. The authors were selected 
as they represent a wide spectrum of philosophical theories, while also constituting an original 
approach and the recognized reference point of the rational decision theory. Their presentation 
undergoes phenomenological (Smith, 2013) analysis of the phenomenon of rational decision 
making.  
The afore-mentioned definition of autotelic values does not answer the question as to 
how they exist. Realist (Kim, 2007; Sayre-McCord, 2011) and objectivist (Harrison, 1967a) 
ethical theories assume that moral values are real entities and moral judgements may be true 
or false. Followers of antirealist theories in ethics (ethical subjectivism) maintain that moral 
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values are not real and moral judgments about them are neither true, nor false (Joyce, 2015; 
Harrison, 1967b). Ethical anti-relativists maintain that moral values are intrinsic and not 
relative to other factors (such as circumstances or assessments). Ethical relativists assume that 
moral values are not intrinsic – they are either relations or functions of human decisions and 
actions. (Brandt, 1967, p. 75-76; Garnett, 1944; Gowans, 2012; Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Jarvie, 
1983; Joyce, 2015; Rorty, 1991; Swoyer, 2014) The study shows how the main thesis of this 
study can be justified and what it means in the contexts of realist (Aristotle), anti-realist 
(Sartre), anti-relativist (Aristotle, Kotarbiński), relativist (Sartre, Weber) and intermediate 
between anti-relativism and relativism (Kant) ethical theories. 
The first section specifies the concept of a methodologically rational decision which is 
referred to in this paper. Sections 2, 3, 4  show some moral conditions for rational decisions: 
the agent’s respect for his/her own existential commitments and for some autotelic values. In 
section 5 we show that the afore-mentioned conditions imply some moral criteria of efficiency 
assessment. 
 
1. The Concept of Methodologically Rational Decisions 
 
Among others, Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1973) distinguishes between factual (objective) 
rationality of actions and methodological (subjective) rationality of their intentions. The first 
one is a peculiar relation between intentions and consequences (effects) of actions. Their 
factual rationality consists of their “adaptation to reality” in terms of their effectiveness 
(effectivity) and efficiency (economy). (Kotarbiński, 1973, p. 123) Their effectiveness is their 
capability of producing desired results. Efficiency of actions is an accomplishment of, or 
ability to accomplish a job with a minimum expenditure of resources (for example, time and 
effort) which the agent has at his/her disposal. Effectivity and efficiency of an action are 
prerequisites for its factual rationality. Their conjunction is the sufficient condition for factual 
rationality of actions. Factually irrational action does not meet the effectivity/efficiency 
conditions – it is ineffective and/or inefficient. Factual rationality (Pol. racjonalność 
rzeczowa) is also known as “objective,” “economic,” “formal” rationality. (Dennis, 2012; 
Hey, 1993; Kleszcz, 1998) 
Although Kotarbiński does not explicitly write about rational decisions, his conception 
of methodological rationality (Pol. racjonalność metodologiczna) denotes their peculiar 
quality. Three prerequisites for methodologically rational decisions are relevant to this study. 
The decisions are as follows: 
(x) consistent with the knowledge of the decision maker, 
(y) motivated by rational beliefs, 
(z) intend factually rational (effective and efficient) actions. 
(x) A methodologically rational agent (who makes methodologically rational 
decisions) investigates the reasons for decisions and accommodates them within his/her 
knowledge (by knowledge, we mean all of the information available to the agent, which, 
given its justification, he or she should assign the probability to act on as if it was true). 
Methodologically irrational agents (who make methodologically irrational decisions) neglect 
their knowledge in their decision making. For example, they can ignore information on the 
risk or relevant circumstances of their actions. (Kotarbiński, 1973, p. 123). 
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(y) Methodologically rational decisions are motivated by rational beliefs. Assertion of 
rational beliefs is symmetric to their justification: A methodologically rational person is sure 
of his/her beliefs proportionally to their justification; he/she is more certain of more justified 
beliefs and less sure of lesser justified beliefs. For example, he/she is more certain of more 
probable than of less probable predictions, while also willing to change opinions when proven 
wrong. Methodologically irrational decisions are not motivated by rational beliefs. A 
methodologically irrational agent can maintain beliefs irrespective of their justification. For 
example, he/she can be more certain of less probable than of more probable predictions or can 
maintain their beliefs when proven wrong (Bortolotti, 2010; Jacko, 2016; Pagin, 2014). 
(z) Methodologically rational agents intend to take factually rational action (its 
effectiveness and efficiency). This condition does not prejudge how their knowledge relates to 
reality. They may be in error and take factually irrational actions despite the intention stated 
above (Simon, 1992). 
The afore-mentioned conditions also apply to decisions made with a high degree of 
uncertainty. For example, religious beliefs and decisions can be methodologically rational 
(though not always), as among others, Józef Maria Bocheński (1990) shows. 
The methodologically rational attitude1 is the inclination to make methodologically 
rational decisions (satisfying the conditions x, y, z). Thanks to such an attitude, agents are 
capable of making decisions of this kind despite endogenous (e.g. being fearful, afraid, or 
tired) or exogenous (e.g. adverse circumstances, environment pressure) determinants. The 
ancient men of wisdom referred to this attitude in their concept of virtue (gr. ἀρετή). (Jaeger, 
1986, 1989; Veath, 2003). 
Despite the fact that the afore-mentioned conception of methodologically rational 
decisions is embedded in philosophy (Gomez, 2014), the conception is of a regulatory nature 
– the conditions for rational decisions may be described either in a way that is similar to the 
one presented in the article or in a much different way. One can also indicate more 
prerequisites for rational decisions (Abell, 1991; Auspitz, Gasparski, Mlicki, Szaniawski, 
1992; Coleman, Fararo, 1992; Dennis, 2012; Gerrard, 1993; Hey, 1993; Kleszcz, 1998; 
Kosiorowski, 2005; Krasnodębski, 1991; Veatch, 2003; Zafirowski, 2003; Zey, 1997). In this 
text the terms “rational decisions” or “rational attitudes” denote methodologically rational 
decisions and attitudes. 
Weber shows two aspects of the phenomenon defined above as methodological 
rationality of decisions – their instrumental (Ger. zweckrational) and value (Ger. wertrational) 
rationality.2 The distinction between instrumental and value rationality of decisions concerns 
two objectives of rational decisions. Instrumentally rational decisions are aimed at 
effectiveness and value rational decisions are aimed at efficiency. Instrumentally rational 
decisions select the means, which (according to the knowledge of the decision maker) are 
                                                 
1Attitude is a system of emotional cognitive and behavioural factors: Its emotional component is your emotional 
reactions to the subject of attitude (e.g. another person or a problem), its cognitive component is your thoughts 
and beliefs about the subject of the attitude and its behavioural component is your action, which is observable 
behaviour towards the subject of attitude (McGuire, 1985). 
2Weber’s concept of rationality of action is subject to criticism. In many areas it lacks precision, and may 
therefore be interpreted in various ways. Nevertheless, it is recognized as a point of reference in literature 
(Danielson 1998; Habermas 1984; Kalberg 1980; Oakes 2003). 
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most effective. Instrumentally irrational decisions do not satisfy the condition - they intend 
the means, which are (according to the knowledge of the decision maker) unsuccessful, or less 
successful than their alternatives. (Weber, 1985, p. 565) Value rational decisions respect the 
commitment of the decision maker to autotelic values and in this way they are aimed at 
efficiency. Value irrational decisions (at all or in some respect) do not follow the 
commitment. (Weber, 1985, p. 565) Decisions can be directly or indirectly value irrational – 
they can directly or indirectly refer to autotelic values. In the former case, value irrational 
decisions do not intend to respect and promote the values. In the latter case, decisions do not 
have the afore-mentioned intention but they are the practical or logical contradiction of the 
aims determined by the autotelic values acknowledged by their entity (Callahan 2007; 
Kalberg 1980; Kim 2007; Kronman, 1983; Oakes 2003; Peukert, 2004; Weber 1985, p. 565; 
2011, 2012). 
The afore-mentioned concept of value rationality highlights the unity of commitments 
of a rational entity. As Weber shows, they constitute a dynamic wholeness, because they are 
by default or directly aimed at achieving a superior objective, which is the autotelic value 
(aim, goal). They imply a hierarchy of values: Instrumental values are precious to the rational 
agent, because they are conditions for, or conductive to more important instrumental values 
and all the instrumental values are precious to him/her because they are conditions for, or 
conductive to the autotelic value. If a value rational agent has to sacrifice some values, he/she 
gives priority to higher value over lower values according to his/her hierarchy of values 
(Weber, 1985, p. 565). 
What is indicated above by the term “value rationality”, Sartre refers to as the 
“authenticity” of decisions. In his opinion, it consists of the compliance of particular decisions 
of the agent with his/her “existential” (“fundamental”) choice of, or commitment to the most 
important values (that design a “project of life”, Fr. durée de vie). Particular decisions are 
authentic when they express this choice. (Crowell, 2004; Flynn, 2013; Heter, 2006; Sartre, 
1956, 1988). 
 
2. Moral Sense of Right Reason 
 
According to the concept of “the right reason” (Gr. ὀρθόςλόγος, Lat. recta ratio), (epistemic) 
truth is an autotelic (although not always achievable) value and respect for the truth is the 
volitional prerequisite for rational decisions. The concept was introduced into the Western 
philosophy by, among others, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. It has been clarified by the 
medieval philosophers, thinkers of the Enlightenment, the Renaissance and those of modern 
times (Gomez 2014, pp. 252–253). 
Some contemporary philosophers, even if they assume ethical relativism, they still can 
implicitly allude to the concept of the right reason. For example, Sartre perceives the 
connection of rational (authentic) decisions with knowledge: As he notes, the lack of 
authenticity can take on a variety of forms, yet in each of them there is a disproportion 
between what one knows and what one believes in. This state – in the language of 
existentialism – is called ‘bad faith’ (Fr. mauvaise foi). It involves self-deception – 
maintaining that one knows what one does not know or one does not know what one knows. It 
leads to divided or double assertion: it occurs when an agent with the same or two acts of 
assertion both affirms and denies a judgment. As Sartre maintains, knowledge is the 
prerequisite for freedom: an agent should take note of how things are in order to be able to 
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take a stand against them. When denying their knowledge, agents give up their freedom. 
Therefore, their respect for their knowledge is the prerequisite for authentic decision making 
(Sartre, 1956). 
For Sartre, respect for knowledge is not a prerequisite for existential commitments as 
he assumed that they are arbitrary and the ultimate criteria of truth, while also moral 
assessments. It implies that the qualification of rationality does not apply to existential 
commitments. Ethical anti-relativists maintain that the afore-mentioned assumption is not 
justified. For example, Kotarbiński shows that moral norms can be more or less (logically) 
consistent with each other and more or less grounded in the knowledge of decision makers. 
As he maintains, methodologically rational agents prefer the most justified solutions from the 
moral standards at stake, whereas the autotelic values and ethical principles should be selected 
by methodologically rational decisions (according to common sense, immediate experience 
and logical principles) and normative ethics should consist of rational beliefs. His 
“independent ethics” (Pol. etyka niezależna) follows the aforesaid postulates (Kotarbiński, 
1958; Szostek, 1971; Woleński, 2006). His conception implies the interdependence between 
(methodological) rationality and validity of existential commitments: (methodologically) 
rational decisions validate moral standards, but the decisions cannot be (methodologically) 
rational without respecting the knowledge of the decision maker (Kotarbiński, 1958, 1958; 
Szostek, 1971). 
 Ethical anti-relativists, such as Kotarbiński, take account of the critique of naturalistic 
fallacy (first noted by David Hume). He does not assume that existential commitments 
(expressed in “ought to” statements) logically follow from knowledge (expressed in “is” 
statements) about facts. Nevertheless, he and other ethical anti-relativists maintain that the 
commitments can be justified in a better or worse manner and rational agents are (morally) 
obliged to prefer the most appropriately justified existential commitments and moral 
principles (Brandt, 1967, p. 75-76; Garnett, 1944; Gowans, 2012; Hollis &Lukes, 1982; 
Jarvie, 1983; Joyce, 2015; Rorty, 1991; Swoyer, 2014). 
The aforesaid exemplary relativist and anti-relativist moral theories differ at some 
crucial points. For example, they can assume different conceptions and criteria of truth. 
Nevertheless, they all assume that rational agents respect their own reason. It implies that 
(epistemic) truth (understood in various ways) is an autotelic (moral) value for rational agents 
and respect for the truth is a prerequisite for rational decisions. 
 
3. Moral Objectives of Rational Decisions 
 
Among others conceptions of Sartre and Weber allude to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, 
who outlines the moral objectives of rational decision making. He shows that a rational agent 
respects logical and causal dependences; while also making decisions based on the principle 
of effectiveness and efficiency of achieving their objectives. As Kant maintains rational 
agents are obliged to this kind of decision-making by hypothetical imperatives that require 
them to respect the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of the objectives 
pursued by the agents. Kant shows that respect to hypothetical imperatives is necessary, albeit 
not a sufficient condition for rational decisions. Their rationality in his view is about 
respecting the superior goal of human commitments. Unlike Sartre or Weber, Kant does not 
assume that this goal is a matter of arbitrary decisions or determined by traditions. As he 
shows, it is determined by the categorical imperative. Its justification lies in the Kantian 
concept (“critique”) of practical reason which – being the domain of freedom – finds the 
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purpose of actions in freedom. According to Kant, rational decisions rely on respecting 
freedom (of oneself and others) by selecting such actions, which do that in an optimal way. 
Such a goal is of a formal nature, but in particular circumstances of action, it becomes 
concretized as knowledge about logical and causal conditions of freedom determines the 
optimal way to respect the categorical imperative in specific cases (Gellner, 1992; Kant, 2010; 
Kim, 2007; O’Neill, 2004; Reath, 2012). 
Kant prima facie specifies the categorical imperative by his analysis of the experience 
(phenomenon) of decision-making. This method of an analysis may be applied to particular 
domains of human activity. For example, Jurgen Habermas (1984) presents this method in his 
conception of rational communication. As he shows, acts of communication are rational, 
while simultaneously respecting the nature of communication of which they are instantiations. 
Kant and Habermas attempt to avoid ontological or epistemological assumptions, 
which cannot be justified as prima facie. In effect, their idea of rationality is much more 
formal than in some realist ethical theories that rely on more developed metaphysical or 
epistemological assumptions, which allow the specification of more characteristics of rational 
decision-making. For example, utilitarians assume that rational decisions directly or indirectly 
intend (individually or socially) useful consequences. The function of (variously defined) 
utility plays the role of an autotelic value in utilitarian theories. In order to specify and 
operationalise the function of utility, utilitarians (implicitly or explicitly) assume some 
conception of human nature and human needs. (Barbera, Hammond, & Seidl, 1998; Driver, 
2014; Hookway, 2013). This solution (usually implicitly) alludes to the theory by Aristotle, 
who formulated the canonical conception of rational decisions. As Stagyrite shows, the 
superior goal (highest good) of human rational commitments is happiness (of the agent and 
other people). It is the fulfilment (Gr. eudemonia, εὐδαιμονία) of human nature. Thanks to this 
assumption and his concept of human nature, Aristotle specifies the particular objectives of 
rational decisions (Aristotle, 2002; Kraut, 2016; May; 2010; Veatch, 2003). Moral objectives 
of rational decisions can also be specified due to some epistemological assumptions. For 
example some phenomenologists, such as Max Scheler (1925) assume that one can know 
autotelic values through direct experience, which indicate the moral objectives of rational 
decision making. 
The afore-mentioned theories (by Aristotle, Habermas, Kant, Scheler, utilitarians) 
show that an action is objectively (factually) rational when it optimises some autotelic (moral) 
values and a decision is subjectively rational when it intends them. In this sense, respect for 
some moral values is the prerequisite for rational actions and decisions. 
 
4. Value versus Instrumental Rationality: Moral Prerequisites for Intending 
Efficiency 
 
As among others, Weber suggests, the value rationality of decisions complements their 
instrumental rationality. Fully rational decisions are both value and instrumentally rational. 
(Callahan 2007; Kalberg 1980; Kim 2007; Kronman, 1983; Oakes 2003; Peukert, 2004; 
Weber 1985, p. 565; 2011, 2012). It may seem that at least in some cases value and 
instrumental rationality may be mutually exclusive. For example, if someone decides to 
accept the desired promotion and he/she knows that this decision will distance him/her from 
more important values (goals) according to his/her hierarchy of values, this decision is not 
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value rational but instrumentally rational. However, strictly speaking, the decision is 
instrumentally rational only in respect to the particular goal of the promotion and it is not 
instrumentally rational in respect to some other goals, which are more important for the agent. 
Hence, the decision is not fully rational. By way of explanation, the agent decides to sacrifice 
the more important goal in order to achieve the less important goal (according to his hierarchy 
of values) - the decision does not intend efficiency. Indeed, one cannot intend the efficiency 
of one’s own actions without respecting one’s own knowledge about one’s own existential 
commitments, which define what their efficiency is. As methodologically rational decisions 
intend efficiency (section 1, condition z), their respect for some autotelic values is a 
prerequisite for methodologically rational decisions. (McKenzie, 2010; Sen, 1977) 
 
5. Some Implications in Economics, Praxeology and Management Sciences: Moral 
Criteria of Efficiency Assessment 
 
As among others, Weber shows, the criteria of efficiency depend on the adopted taxonomy of 
resources, the taxonomy is determined by the hierarchy of values and the hierarchy depends 
on the agent’s commitment to autotelic values and his/her understanding of their operational 
meaning. (Callahan 2007; Kalberg 1980; Kim 2007; Kronman, 1983; Oakes 2003; Peukert, 
2004; Weber 1985, p. 565; 2011, 2012) Thus, a comprehensive assessment of the efficiency is 
not complete without taking account of those values that the agent considers to be autotelic. 
This observation implies moral criteria of efficiency assessment as autotelic values imply 
some moral norms that translate the values into practice (operationalise them). These norms 
are the criteria of efficiency assessment. (Honigsheim, 2003) Similarly, Sartre maintains that 
logical and practical relationships occur between the existential choices and particular 
decisions of a human. These relationships allow for the assessment of human decisions in 
terms of their efficiency relating to whether they are successful in expressing and respecting 
the existential commitment of the agent. Such an assessment has ethical bearing, since the 
choice of the superior objective is the superior norm of private morality (Flynn, 2013; Heter, 
2006a; Sartre, 1989). The afore-mentioned authors prima facie (by their analysis of the 
phenomenon of rational decision making) justify their thesis on the moral criteria of 
efficiency assessment. 
 The thesis can be justified by way of the contexts of relativistic as well as in anti-
relativistic moral theories. An ethical relativist, "denies that there is any one correct moral 
evaluation" (Brandt, 1967, p. 75). Sartre is a representative of ethical relativism. He shows 
that rational (authentic) entities have to commit themselves to an autotelic value and the value 
implies some moral criteria of efficiency assessment, but the criteria are valid only in the 
perspective of the commitment to the autotelic value. It implies that the criteria are not 
universally valid. Ethical anti-relativists assume some universal moral values, which imply 
some universally valid moral norms and criteria of efficiency assessment. For example, Henry 
Mintzberg (1982, p. 104) maintains that efficient actions have to promote some “social 
values”. It is the prerequisite for their efficiency. Indeed, he does not specify them, but just 
shows that some values are not arbitrary and have to be taken into account in terms of 
efficiency assessment, albeit it is not easy to measure them. As Mintzberg notes, efficiency is 
not the same as “demonstrated efficiency, proven efficiency, and above all, calculated 
efficiency” (Mintzberg, 1982, p. 102). As he maintains, efficiency is qualitative and 
quantitative methods can lead to errors, which consist of overlooking social values in the 
efficiency assessment (Mintzberg, 1982, p. 103).  
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 Likewise, some other contemporary theories introduce moral criteria into sciences 
dealing with the efficiency of actions. Some ongoing discussions of “bounded rationality” 
(Simon, 1982, 1992), economic rationality (McKenzie, 2010; Sen, 1977) or approaches to risk 
management (Luetge & Jauernig, 2013) demonstrate the role of moral attitudes and normative 
criteria in heuristic intuitive methods (for example, emotional intelligence) of decision 
making (Arvidsson & Peitersen, 2016; Brown, 2010; Gasparski, Szaniawski, 1977; Klimczak, 




The concepts presented in the herein paper differ in terms of their epistemology, ontology and 
methodology. Despite their discrepancies, they all show that respect for some autotelic 
(moral) values is the condition for methodologically rational decisions and decisions 
which do not satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all, or not 
fully rational. We present this thesis in sections 2, 3, and 4. Kant, Sartre, Habermas and 
Kotarbiński prima facie justify it by their (phenomenological) analyses of decision making. 
Additionally, this is exemplified by Aristotle, Scheler and utilitarians, who have based the 
thesis on some additional ontological and epistemological assumptions, which are prima facie 
justified too. It does not have any other proof there. Therefore, the thesis plays the role of the 
premise in the aforesaid theories and as such, it can be the subject of deliberation and further 
investigation. 
We do not maintain that one cannot successfully investigate efficiency of decisions 
without taking account its moral conditions. For example, the mathematical theory of games 
does not have to do it in order to find fitting solutions for some dilemmas. This and similar 
examples do not prove that the afore-mentioned premise is theoretically or practically useless. 
As some authors show, the failure to take account of the moral aspects of rational decisions 
can lead to paradoxes in theory and to counterproductive or socially harmful strategies or 
practice (Danielson, 1998; Jacko, 2009; McKenzie, 2010; Mintzberg, 1982; Sen, 1977). In 
section 4 and 5 we show how this premise can supplement the models of rational decision 
making by indicating the moral aspects of efficiency and ethical criteria of efficiency 
assessment. Therefore, in some cases the premise may be helpful in explaining, predicting and 
guiding human decisions. However, in some other cases it may be irrelevant in terms of 
research when it does not include the moral aspects of decisions making. In any case, one 
should not dogmatically (without sufficient reason) exclude moral conditions for rational 







Abell, P. (1991). Rational Choice Theory. Hants, Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Aristotle (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. (trans. D. W. Ross) Adelaide: The University of 
Adelaide Library. 
Arvidsson, A., & Peitersen, N. (2016). The Ethical Economy. Rebuilding Value after the 
Crisis. Columbia: Columbia University Press. 
Auspitz J. L., W. Gasparski, M. Mlicki, K. Szaniawski (Eds.). (1992) Praxiologies and the 
Philosophy of Economics. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.  
Barbera, S., Hammond, P., & Seidl, C. (Eds.). (1998). Handbook of Utility Theory: Volume 1: 
Principles. Dortreht, Boston, London: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Bochenski J. M. (1965).The Logic of Religion. New York: New York University Press 
Bortolotti, L. (2010). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford, New York: OUP 
Oxford. 
Brandt, R. B. (1967). Ethical relativism. In: P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Vol.3-4, pp. 75–78. New York: McMillan. 
Brown, M.T. (2010). The ethics of economic systems. In: Civilizing the Economy, pp. 178-
192.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Callahan, G. (2007). Reconciling Weber and Mises on understanding human action. American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 66 (5), 889–99. 
Coleman J.S., T.J. Fararo, (Eds.), (1992). Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and Critique. 
London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications. 
Crowell, S. (2004). Existentialism. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/existentialism/ [accessed: March 5, 
2016] 
Danielson, P. (ed.). (1998). Modelling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution. New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dennis, K. (ed.). (2012). Rationality in Economics: Alternative Perspectives. New York: 
Springer Science & Business Media. 
Driver, J. (2014). The history of utilitarianism. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [accessed: 
March 5, 2016] 
Fletcher, J. F. (1966). Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 
Flynn, T. (2013). Jean-Paul Sartre. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/sartre/ 
[accessed: March 5, 2016]. 
Garnett, A. C. (1944). Relativism and absolutism in ethics. Ethics 54 (3), 186–199. 
Gasparski, W., Szaniawski, K. (1977). Praxiology and decision theory. In H. Jungermann, G. 
de Zeeuw (eds), Decision Making and Change in Human Affairs, pp 491–506. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Gellner, E. (1992). Reason and Culture. Oxford, Cambridge: Wiley. 
Gerrard B. (Ed.), 1993. The Economics of Rationality. London, New York: Routledge. 
10 
 
Gomez, V.G. (2014). Rationality and method. In J. Malpas and H.H. Gander (eds.), The 
Routlege Companion to Hermeneutics, pp. 251–266. Oxon, New York: Routledge. 
Gowans, C. (2012). Moral relativism. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/moral-
relativism/ [accessed: March 5, 2016] 
Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1. Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Harrison, J. (1967a). Ethical objectivism. In P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Vol. 3-4., pp. 71–75. New York: McMillan. 
Harrison, J. (1967b). Ethical subjectivism. In P. Edwards (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
Vol. 3–4, pp. 78–81. New York: McMillan. 
Heter, S. (2006). Sartre’s political philosophy. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-p/  [accessed: March 5, 2016] 
Hey, J.D. (1993). Rationality is as rationality does. In: B. Gerrard (ed.), The Economics of 
Rationality, pp. 4–14. London, New York: Routledge. 
Hollis, M., & Lukes, S. (eds.). (1982). Rationality and Relativism. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Honigsheim, P. (2003). The Unknown Max Weber, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publisher. 
Hookway, C. (2016). Pragmatism. W E. N. Zalta (Red.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2016), retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/pragmatism/ [accessed: March 5, 2016] 
Jacko, J. F. (2009). Niektóre ontologiczne rozstrzygnięcia Teorii Gier na przykładzie 
Dylematu Podróżnika i Dylematu Więźnia. Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa, 3-4 (181-
182), 429-41. 
Jacko, J. F. (2016). Rational informative assertiveness in management communication. 
Jagiellonian Journal of Management 2, 35–44. 
Jarvie, I. C. (1983). Rationality and relativism. In: Thinking about Society: Theory and 
Practice, pp. 50–69. Dortrecht, Boston, Lancaster: R. Reidel Publishing Company.  
Brandt, R. B. (1967a). Ethical relativism. In P. Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Vol. 3–4, pp. 75–78). New York: McMillan. 
Brandt, R. B. (1967b). Ethical Relativism. In P. Edwards (Ed.) (Vol. 3–4, pp. 75–78). New 
York: McMillan. 
Fletcher, J. F. (1966). Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 
Gowans, C. (2012). Moral Relativism. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 201). 
Sayre-McCord, G. (2011). Moral realism. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2011). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/moral-realism/ 
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1919). O bezwzględności dobra. Warszawa: Gebether i Wolf. 
Joyce, R. (2015). Moral anti-realism. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/moral-
anti-realism/ [accessed: March 5, 2016] 
Kalberg, S. (1980). Max Weber’s types of rationality. The American Journal of Sociology, 85 
(5), 1145–1179. 
Kant, I. (2010). The Critique of Practical Reason. (trans. T.K. Abbott) Adelaide: The 
University of Adelaide. 
Kim, S.H. (2007). Max Weber. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/weber/ 
[accessed: March 5, 2016]. 
11 
 
Kleszcz, R. (1998). O racjonalności: studium epistemologiczno-metodologiczne. Łódź: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. 
Klimczak, B. (2014). Aksjologiczne uwikłanie ekonomii. Annales. Etyka w Życiu 
Gospodarczym 17 (1), 9–21. 
Kotarbiński, T. (1958). Zasady etyki niezależnej. Studia Filozoficzne 1, 3–13. 
Kotarbiński, T. (1973). Traktat o dobrej robocie. Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk: 
Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich. 
Kosiorowski D. (2005). Individual rationality versus group rationality in statistical modelling 
issues. W: Baier, D., Wernecke, K.D. (Eds.), Innovations in Classification, Data 
Science, and Information Systems, Studies in Classification, Data Analysis, and 
Knowledge Organization. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer: 239–248. 
Kraut, R. (2016) Aristotle's ethics. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-
ethics/ [accessed: 5.03.2016]. 
Krasnodębski, Z. M. (1991). Działanie i jego racjonalność w perspektywie prakseologicznej i 
socjologicznej. Prakseologia (1-2), 27–43. 
Kronman, A. T. (1983). Max Weber. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Luetge, Ch., J. Jauernig, eds. (2013). Business Ethics and Risk Management. Dortrecht: 
Springer Science and Business Media. 
May, H. (2010). Aristotle’s Ethics: Moral Development and Human Nature. London, New 
York: Continuum. 
McGuire, W. (1985). Attitudes and attitude change. In: Lindzey, G., & Aronson, E. (eds.) 
Handbook of Social Psychology: Special Fields and Applications, vol. 2. New York: 
Random House, 233–346. 
McKenzie, R. B. (2009). Predictably Rational? In Search of Defenses for Rational Behavior 
in Economics. Heilderberg, Dortrecht, London, New York: Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
Mintzberg, H. (1982). A note on that dirty word “efficiency”. Interfaces 12 (5): 101–5.  
Mintzberg, H. (1994). The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: Free Press. 
Moore, G.E. (1899). The nature of judgment. Mind 8 (30), 176–193. 
Moore, G.E. (1909). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press. 
Oakes. (2003). Max Weber on value rationality and value spheres – critical remarks. Journal 
of Classical Sociology 3 (1), 27–45. 
O’Neill, O. (2004). Kant: rationality as practical reason. In: A.R. Mele, P. Rawling (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Rationality, pp. 93-109. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pagin, P. (2014). Assertion. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/assertion/ [accessed: 
5.03.2016]. 
Peukert, H. (2004). Max Weber. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63 (5), 987–
1020. 
Reath, A. (2012). Kant’s moral philosophy. In: R. Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Ethics, pp. 443-464. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Brandt, R. B. (1967a). Ethical relativism. In P. Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Vol. 3–4, pp. 75–78). New York: McMillan. 
Brandt, R. B. (1967b). Ethical Relativism. In P. Edwards (Ed.) (Vol. 3–4, pp. 75–78). New 
York: McMillan. 
Fletcher, J. F. (1966). Situation Ethics: The New Morality. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 
Gowans, C. (2012). Moral Relativism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 201). 
12 
 
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1919). O bezwzględności dobra. Warszawa: Gebetheri Wolf. 
Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and Nothingness. A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. (trans. 
H. Barnes). New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Washington Square Press.  
Sartre, J. P. (1988). Existentialism is a humanism. In W. A. Kaufmann (ed., trans. P. Mairet, 
Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, pp. 245–368. New York: Meridian 
Publishing Company. 
Sayre-McCord, G. (2011). Moral realism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2011), retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/moral-realism/  [accessed March 5, 
2016] 
Scheler, M. (1925). Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung. Bonn: Vlg von Friedrich 
Cohen. 
Sen, A. K. (1977). Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic 
theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4), 317-344. 
Simon, H. A. (1992). Methodological foundations of economics. In J.L. Auspitz, W. 
Gasparski, M. Mlicki, & K. Szaniawski (eds.), Praxiologies and the Philosophy of 
Economics (pp. 25–42). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
Smith, D.W. (2013). Phenomenology. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2013), retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/phenomenology/ [accessed March 
5, 2016]. 
Swoyer, C. (2014). Relativism. In The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Stanford: E. N. 
Zalta (ed.), retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/relativism/ [accessed March 5, 
2016]. 
Szaniawski, K, (1994). O nauce, rozumowaniu i wartościach. Warszawa: PWN. 
Szostek, A. (1971). Etyka jako nauka empiryczna w ujęciu T. Czeżowskiego i T. 
Kotarbińskiego. Roczniki Filozoficzne 19 (2), 43–57. 
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1919). O bezwzględności dobra. Warszawa: Gebether i Wolf. 
Veatch, H.B. (2003). Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
Weber, M. (1985). Gesammelte Aufsätzezur Wissenschaftslehre. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Weber, M. (2011). Methodology of Social Sciences. (trans. E. Shils, H.A. Finch) New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
Weber, M. (2012). Max Weber: Collected Methodological Writings. (eds. S. Whimster & H. 
H. Bruun, trans. H. H. Bruun). London; New York: Routledge. 
Westacott, E. (2012). Moral relativism. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, retrieved from 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/ [accessed: March 5, 2016] 
Wight, J.B. (2015). Ethics in Economics: An Introduction to Moral Frameworks. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 
Woleński, J. (2006). Naturalistyczne uzasadnienie etyki niezależnej (spolegliwego opiekuna). 
Etyka  39, 7–14. 
Zafirowski, M. (2003). Human Rational Behaviour and Economic Rationality. Electronic 
Journal of Sociology 7(2), retrieved from 
http://www.sociology.org/content/vol7.2/02_zafirovski.html [accessed: March 5, 
2016] 
Zey, M. (1997). Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique. London, 
New Delhi: SAGE Publications. 
